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1. Introduction 
Since the inception of transition in 1978, China has achieved a stirring economic 
success with average GDP growth rate of 8.3 percent (World Bank, 2000) and 
accounting for 25 percent share of global economic growth in 1995-2002 (Economist, 
2003). Remarkable economic performance boosted the per capita GDP by about 22 
times of 379 RMB in 1978 to 8,184 RMB in 2002 (CSY, 2003). Contrary to Wagner’s 
Law, which suggests that public sector augment in accordance with increasing 
economic growth and per capita income, government expenditure relative to total 
GDP in China is, yet, shrinking. As shown in Figure 1, the ratio of government 
expenditure1 to GDP dropped from 31% in 1978 to the rock bottom of 12% in 1995 
and 1996 despite recent recovery of 21% in 2002. It remains, yet, strikingly lower 
compared to the average level of 28 OECD countries, 41%, and even the lowest 
member, Korea, of 25% (OECD, 2002). An interesting question arises, especially, 
when the public sector has undergoing a continuous growth in most Western 
economies since World War II, why does China, a communist country, moves in the 
opposite direction? 
 
[insert figure 1 about here] 
 
Following Adolph Wagner, volumes of works exist to deal with the trends, causes, 
and effects of expanding public sector in Western economies, such as Peacock and 
Wiseman (1961), Musgrave (1959; 1969), Bird (1970), Meltzer and Richard (1981), 
Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999) and Dudley and Witt (2004), etc. However, few 
researches pay particular attention to China’s odd trend of shrinkage of government 
size except that some only touches upon this point. Based on our related literatures 
review, several possible explanations might be raised. Firstly, the demand side 
                                                        
1 Chinese public budget system includes extrabudgetary revenue and expenditure, originated in 1950 as a 
supplementary to the budgetary part. The data of the extrabudgetary revenue and expenditure only started in 1982 
since the statistic reporting scheme was established then. Hereafter the government revenue and expenditure refers 
to the budgetary one.  
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approach attributes to the transition process of China from a central-planned to a 
market economy resulting in the fade out of excessive government intervention. 
Naturally, the government expenditure is cut down thanks to massive private saving 
and investment in various economic fields. Secondly, from the supply side, the reform 
of budget system changes the structure of government revenue source and then 
constrains government financial capacity. Unlike pre-reform budget system mainly 
relies on profit remittance from state-owned enterprises (SOEs), tax collection now is 
the major means to finance government activities. While an undeveloped tax 
administration and lack of voluntary tax compliance severely hamper levies of 
government revenue. A third argument might be the problem of statistic technique in 
that a large size of extrabudgetary, even off-budgetary, expenditure is not shown up in 
official statistic data2. Thus, the de facto government size should be larger than that in 
the Figure 1. 
In addition to preceding three plausible explanations, we argue that fiscal 
decentralization also induces a smaller government in transition China. In contrast 
with traditional public finance theory modeling government as a benevolent despotic 
agency subject to public interests, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) depict the 
government as a monolithic Leviathan to maximize its revenue by exploiting tax base 
to the maximum extent. From such perspective, they claim that the fiscal 
decentralization is a powerful institutional constraint on the reach of the state. Thus, 
an implication is that “total government intrusion into the economy should be smaller, 
ceteris paribus, the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are 
decentralized…” (p.185).  
 
Considering numerous empirical tests on Leviathan hypothesis have been 
conducted but with conflicting results, we intend not only to address the problem why 
government size is curtailed in China, but also to offer a new window to examine the 
Leviathan hypothesis by analyzing panel data of China due to following reasons: i) a 
                                                        
2 See footnote 1. 
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de facto fiscal decentralization in China is accredited by numerous scholars and 
researchers (see e.g. Montinola et al, 1995; Qian and Weingast, 1996,1997; Weingast, 
1995); ii) the absence of representative democracy lends a great opportunity for 
testing whether fiscal decentralization is another effective institutional arrangement to 
curb government expansion; and iii) China’s sheer size permits a panel data analysis 
on subnational level. Particularly, in addition to several literature (see e.g. Zhang and 
Zou, 1998; Ma, 1997; Lin and Liu, 2000) that only investigate the influence of fiscal 
decentralization on China’s economic growth, we intend to address the empirical issue 
of fiscal decentralization and government size in China. 
 
The paper will proceed as follows. Next section sets out three possible explanations 
of a shrinking Chinese government. Section 3 presents a survey of empirical literature 
on Leviathan hypothesis and our approach to China case, followed by the section of 
methodology and data. Section 5 provides the empirical results. The final section 
draws the conclusion. 
 
2. Changing public sector in transition China 
2.1 The demand side 
Given the transition nature, the developing market economy forces government to 
retreat from most economic fields (see e.g. Walder, 1996; Naughton, 1995). Price 
liberation and privatization have toppled traditional dominance of government in 
economy and unleashed dramatic growth of non-state sector. In 1999, the non-state 
share of gross output industrial value (GOIV) increased more than 3 times of the 1980 
level from 24% to 74%. And the non-state percentage of fixed investment also 
expanded from only 18% in 1980 to 47% in 1999 (Figure 2). As a result, to meet the 
shrinking demand for government intervention in economy, the government 
expenditure on economic construction scaled to GDP has steadily declined since the 
transition. Dropped from 20% in 1978, it hit the bottom of 5% in 1996, which mainly 
contributed to the descent of government outlay in GDP. Meanwhile, the successive 
cut of expenditure on national defense from 5% in 1978 to 1% in 1996 was also 
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responsible for that. Recently, a slight rise of expenditure on all functions, such as 
economic, social, cultural and education, administration and miscellaneous, pulled the 
government share back from the bottom of 12% in 1995 and 1996 to 21% of GDP in 
2002 (Figure 3).  
 
[insert figure 2 and 3 about here] 
 
2.2 The supply side 
A series of fiscal reforms have rebuilt revenue structure of government indicating 
the transformation from a socialist “owner-state” (Campbell, 1996) surviving upon 
controlled resources to a modern “tax-state” (Schumpeter, 1918) subject to its tax 
capability to extract surplus from economic sectors. Before the transition, Chinese 
government revenue largely relied on SOEs that not only remitted their profits, but 
also paid taxes according to a simple socialist tax system. As shown in Figure 4, 
revenue remitted from SOEs made up of 51% of total government revenue in 1978. 
Yet, the booming non-state enterprises eroded the previous dominance of SOEs in 
economy and forced them to become loss-making during market competition. In 1985, 
the subsidy to those loss-making SOEs held 25% of total government revenue, about 
13 times more than the revenue from those profitable. SOEs turned out to be a heavy 
financial burden of the government.  
 
[insert figure 4 about here] 
 
On the other hand, the new tax system introduced western taxes, broadened tax 
base to non-state sector, shifted the focus of tax collection and administration to a 
large number of small-size enterprises and individuals and made taxes principal 
revenue source (nearly 100% or more since 1985), which extremely challenged 
government’s tax capability (see e.g. Wong, 1997; World Bank, 2002). Moreover, the 
lack of traditional tax compliance of private sector and individuals exacerbated such 
problems. Consequently, The financial capability of government was severely 
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constrained by the inadaptable tax system. The ratio of total fiscal revenue to GDP 
plummeted from 31% in 1978 to 11% in 1995 and 1996 and recently recovered to 
18% in 2002. And the fiscal deficit peaked in 1979 at 3.4% of GDP and controlled 
around 1% for several years but was enlarging again since 1998. The fiscal deficit was 
3% of GDP in 2002 (Figure 5). 
 
[insert figure 5 about here] 
 
2.3 The hidden figures 
The existence of extensive extrabudgetary or even off-budgetary activities implies 
that the actual amount of government revenue and expenditure is much larger than 
those budgetary figures (see e.g. Wong, 1998; Fan, 1998; Eckaus, 2003; Krug et al, 
2005). Originated in 1950 to mitigate the scarcity of local financial resource, 
extrabudgetary revenue consists of administrative service charges, funds, and 
surcharges on taxes levied by the State Council, the provincial government or 
corresponding financial and price regulation departments. It remained a minor part 
before 1980s but experienced a vicious spiral after that. In 1978, the extrabudgetary 
revenue possessed 10% of GDP and escalated to 17% and accounted for half of total 
actual government revenue during 1980s (Figure 6). In addition, volumes of 
off-budgetary revenues and expenditures escaped from the public budget system and 
excluded from the budgetary figures. Thus, the actual government size of China is, to 
a large extent, underestimated.  
 
[insert figure 6 about here] 
 
3. Leviathan and decentralized China 
3.1 Leviathan theory 
In addition to preceding three explanations, we approach the shrinking Chinese 
government size by Leviathan theory. In Brennan and Buchanan’s model (1980), the 
government consists of self-interest politicians and bureaucrats who maximize their 
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discretionary resources and powers by all means so as to create the 
revenue-maximizing nature of a Leviathan government. Moreover, akin to a 
monopoly firm in the market, government monopolizes the provision of public goods 
and service, thereby exploits its citizenry-consumers to the extreme extent through 
maximized taxation. The democratic electoral process is, therefore, designed to hold 
back government’s latent “grabbing hand” at the post-constitutional level. Indeed, 
underpinning the democracy, the commonly believed majority rule “embodies no 
effective constraint on the exercise of government powers at all ” (1980:7, italic in 
original; see also Downs, 1957). Thus, as an alternative institutional arrangement, 
fiscal federalism may actually constrain government’s insatiable appetite for fiscal 
expansion thanks to its two major merits: information revelation and competition (e.g. 
Musgrave, 1959; 1969; Oates, 1972). On the one hand, along the vertical government 
hierarchy, decentralized decision-making (Hayek, 1945) enables citizens more 
effectively check and balance on government coercive powers to tax in that the 
principal-agent problem might be better addressed by sufficient information 
revelation under closer distance between lower level government and its 
constituencies. Thus, the share of lower-level government in total government 
revenues and expenditures captures the degree of decentralized authority from 
upper-level. On the other hand, Tieboutian mobility (1956) of individuals and factors 
introduces horizontal interjurisdictional competition for fiscal resources and such 
“voting by feet” forces government to be a rational public goods provider 
economizing on relative tax cost. Any excessive tax burden would, obviously, induce 
massive migrations of tax bases to other regions with less tax levies. The number of 
rival jurisdictions, hence, determines the degree of intergovernmental competition. 
Consequently, two hypothesis are developed:   
 
Decentralization hypothesis: The more decentralized fiscal authority to lower-level 
government, the smaller is the total government size.  
 
Fragmentation hypothesis: The more rival jurisdictions, the smaller is the total 
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government size.  
 
Furthermore, due to the mobility of tax base, economies of scale and scope, fiscal 
equity ground and spillover effect, the vertical tax structure is known as the 
tax-assignment problem (see e.g. McLure, 1983; Musgrave, 1997; Oates, 1999) in 
which central government levies most taxes and transfers to local government 
according to certain criteria or object. Yet, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) 
acknowledge that such intergovernmental collusion would moderate the 
interjurisdictional competitive pressures and lessen the effective constraint of fiscal 
decentralization on government size “because it subverts the primary purpose of 
federalism, which is to create competition between jurisdictions (p.183)”. Measured 
by intergovernmental grants, collusion hypothesis implies a larger government 
extraction. 
 
Collusion hypothesis: The more intergovernmental grants, the larger is the total 
government size.  
 
3.2 A survey of empirical literature 
Although Leviathan theory has the sound theoretical ground, numerous empirical 
studies headed by Oates have shown inconsistent evidences at national, subnational 
and/or local level (Table 1)3. Based on a cross-section sample of 57 countries, Oates 
(1972) conducted a simple regression of government size (share of tax revenues in 
national income) on decentralization (central government tax revenue as a fraction of 
total tax revenues) and found a significant inverse relation that increased 
decentralization resulted in a larger government sector. After controlling variable of 
income level for Wagner’s Law, the coefficient remained negative but statistically 
insignificant, which lent no support to the decentralization hypothesis. In 1985, Oates 
used 43 IMF countries sample and again found no statistically significant association 
                                                        
3 The survey of previous empirical literatures is based on Shadbegian (1999) and Feld (2003).  
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between fiscal decentralization and government size. Yet, the empirical result verified 
the collusion hypothesis that relatively heavy intergovernmental grants induce larger 
public sectors. To address the latent unreliability of IMF data, Heil (1991) used two 
comparison samples of 22 OECD and 39 IMF countries. In addition to Ordinary Least 
Squares technique, he also ran the Two-stage Least Squares regression by 
constructing federal structure, literacy rate and gross exports as percentage of GDP as 
instrumental variables. In all cases, no significant impact of fiscal decentralization on 
government size was obtained at the national level. Moreover, Stein (1999) observed 
relatively larger governments in fiscal decentralized Latin America, particularly, when 
subnational governments enjoyed extensive vertical imbalance, discretional transfer 
and borrowing autonomy. Yet, in Moesen and van Cauwenberge (2000), 
decentralization variable was matched by local tax autonomy, thereby excluded 
intergovernmental grants and local borrowing, i.e., subnational government taxes as a 
percentage of total government expenditures. The estimation result of 19 OECD 
countries supported Leviathan hypothesis that a decentralized tax authority tended to 
reduce overall government size. Rodden (2003) and Anderson and van Den Berg 
(1998) confirmed this point as well. Furthermore, Rodden provided empirical 
evidence that decentralization accompanied by intergovernmental transfers produced 
a larger government. Different from aggregate government size as dependent variable 
in customarily analyses, Jin and Zou (2002) explored how government size at 
different level was influenced by different fiscal decentralization measures. Using 
panel data of 17 industrial and 15 developing countries from 1980-1994, they found 
that: i) expenditure decentralization resulted in smaller national governments, larger 
subnational governments and larger overall government size; ii) revenue 
decentralization increased subnational government size but much more reduced 
national one, thereby cut down aggregate government size; and iii) intergovernmental 
grants enlarged government size at all levels. Marlow (1988) initially performed a 
time-series regression on 1946-1985 data of the United State and found strong 
supporting evidence for the decentralization hypothesis. Later, Grossman (1989a; 
1989b), using the same data set, verified that decentralization (share of subnational 
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expenditure in total government expenditure) curtailed government spending (total 
government expenditure relative to GNP) while federal-to-state grants encouraged 
government expansion. Similarly, Australia (1950-1984) and Canada (1958-1987) 
data were tested in Grossman (1992) and Grossman and West (1994), respectively. In 
the former case, the collusion hypothesis was demonstrated but not the 
decentralization one; while in the latter case, both hypotheses were supported. Kwon 
(2003) analyzed time-series data of Korea from 1979 to 2001 and obtained supporting 
findings as well.  
[insert table 1 about here] 
 
At the subnational level, Oates (1985) regressed cross-section data (1977) of 48 
contiguous US states. In his estimated specification, the dependent variable was the 
state government size measured by aggregate state-local tax receipts as a fraction of 
personal income and his aimed explanatory variables included the state share of 
state-local revenues and expenditures (decentralization hypothesis) and number of 
local government units (fragmentation hypothesis) while intergovernmental grants as 
a percentage of state-local general revenues (collusion hypothesis), together with per 
capita personal income, population and urbanization ratio, was constructed as a 
control variable. Neither of the regression results showed statistically significant 
association between explanatory variable and dependent variable. Nonetheless, 
collusion hypothesis was partially supported by one of three equations in which a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient was resulted. While in the following 
empirical studies based on the same level, the decentralization hypothesis was 
supported by Wallis and Oates (1988), Joulfain and Marlow (1990; 1991), and 
Shadbegian (1999) and the collusion hypothesis was supported by Raimondo (1989), 
Grossman (1989) and Shadbegian (1999). With regard to fragmentation hypothesis, 
Nelson (1986; 1987) found general-purpose local government units increased 
intergovernmental competition and then restricted the state-local government size. In 
addition to US states data, de Mello (2001) used 38 rayons (subnational) data in 
Moldova that provided supporting evidence for above three hypotheses. Feld et al 
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(2003) also lent support to decentralization and collusion hypothesis except 
fragmentation one based evidence from 26 Swiss cantons (subnational).  
 
Empirical studies at local level mainly concentrate on counties and municipalities 
in SMSAs of the United States. Forbes and Zampelli (1989) reject fragmentation 
hypothesis with a positive and significant effect of the number of counties on county 
government size, using sample of 345 counties in 157 SMSAs. Zax (1989) expanded 
sample to 3022 counties and Eberts and Gronberg (1988) used 2900 counties, both 
observing that increased general-purpose local government units were likely to reduce 
government size. Sjoquist (1982), Schneider (1986), and Eberts and Gronberg (1990) 
also found supporting evidence for fragmentation hypothesis at municipalities or 
SMSAs level. A more recent investigation undertaken by Campbell (2004) suggested 
different government levels matter how decentralization impact on government size: i) 
increased decentralization of expenditures tends to decrease municipal expenditures 
while have no influence on county expenditures; ii) increased fragmentation reduced 
county expenditures but has no effect on municipal expenditures.  
 
3.3 Decentralized China 
 Considering the mixed empirical results, further study based on new data set is 
warranted to unravel the contradiction in the existing literature. China may be the 
right case. Firstly, a de facto fiscal decentralization has been resulted during last two 
decades. Local interests for development, together with the policy legacy of rural 
autarky in Mao era, accelerate the formation of a Chinese style of fiscal federalism 
(see e.g. Montinola et al, 1995; Qian and Weingast, 1996,1997; Weingast, 1995). 
Since transition in 1978, China has undertaken decentralization through a series of tax 
and fiscal reforms: tax-for-profit reform (1983-84), fiscal contracting system (1985-93) 
and 1994 tax-sharing system, etc (see e.g. World Bank, 1990; 1995; 2002; Wong, 
1995; 1997; 1998). Under the fiscal contracting system, central government assigned 
fixed revenue-remittance contract and made local government de facto residual 
claimant intensively pursuing revenue surplus. As shown in Figure 7, central share of 
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budgetary revenue went on diminishing during 1985-93, which dropped 16 percent 
from 38% to 22%. The ratio of central to total budgetary expenditure fell from 40% to 
28%. The continuous shrinkage of central revenue and expenditure provoked a tax 
reform in 1994, aimed to arrest the declining trend and recentralize the fiscal capacity. 
The result was dramatic that central share of budgetary revenue boosted into 56% of 
total in 1994 and kept average 51% recent years. Yet, on the extrabudgetary revenue 
and expenditure side, remarkable decentralization was undergoing, particularly after 
1992, that local share of extrabudgetary revenue and expenditure rocketed from 56% 
in 1992 to highest 95% in 1998 and remained average 92% in 2001 (Figure 8).  
 
[insert figure 7 and 8 about here] 
 
Secondly, as Brennan and Buchanan point out, the fiscal decentralization may 
effectively constrain government’s power to tax even when the democratic monitor 
fails. From this point of view, the absence of representative democracy in China offers 
a great opportunity for testing such hypothesis. Thirdly, China’s sheer size allows a 
panel data analysis on subnational level. Its subnational government hierarchy 
consists of 31 provincial level government units, 333 prefectures, 2,074 counties, and 
44,741 townships in 2000.4 
 
4. Methodology and data 
We intend to test the impact of decentralization, fragmentation, and collusion on 
government size and thereby address the problem of shrinking public sectors and 
inconsistency of Wagner’s Law in China. Since tax reform in 1994 dramatically 
changed Chinese tax and fiscal system, we choose annual data from 1995 to 2002 
across 31 provinces as our panel data set.  
 
                                                        
4 Provincial level government units refer to 22 provinces (sheng), 5 autonomous regions (zizhiqu), and 4 
autonomous municipalities (zhixiashi, Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing). Taiwan province and two 
special administrative regions, Hong Kong and Macao are excluded. 
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4.1 Variables and model 
The empirical model is as follows: 
GOVit=β0+βx Xit+βc Cit+βs Sit +uit                             (1) 
where i and t denotes province and year, respectively. GOVit stands for government 
size, Xit denotes set of independent variables which we are interested in, Cit denotes 
conventional control variables used in previous empirical studies, Sit is specific 
control variables to capture Chinese transition situation, and uit denotes the error term.  
 
Following previous empirical literature, the dependent variable (GOVBE) is 
measured by the aggregate provincial budgetary expenditure as share of provincial 
GDP. Considering Chinese specific extrabudgetary spending, we also have GOVCE as 
the ratio of consolidated provincial expenditure including budgetary and 
extrabudgetary expenditure to provincial GDP. Suggested by Zhang and Zou (1998) 
that revenue is not a good indicator of decentralization in China, we construct three 
fiscal decentralization variables based on expenditure at two different levels: 
central-provincial and provincial-local level. DEC_CPBE is the ratio of provincial to 
central budgetary expenditure per capita; DEC_CPCE is the ratio of provincial to 
central consolidated budgetary and extrabudgetary expenditure per capita; DEC_PL is 
the share of subprovincial in aggregate provincial-subprovincial consolidated 
budgetary and extrabudgetary expenditure. In addition to vertical dimension of fiscal 
decentralization, numbers of local government units, such as prefecture, county and 
township, of each province (NUMLG) reflects the degree of interjurisdictional 
competition at horizontal fragmentation dimension. In line with Grossman (1989) to 
test the influence of intergovernmental collusion on the dependent variable, the 
GRANTSBE and GRANTSCE is the share of total central grants to province in aggregate 
provincial-subprovincial budgetary and consolidated expenditure, respectively.  
Population (POP), urbanization (URB) and per capita income (INC) are conventional 
control variables that are always include in the regression. Two specific control 
variables—SOE, the share of SOEs in total gross industrial output value of each 
province and OPENNESS, the share of total volume of foreign trade (the sum of 
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exports and imports) in provincial GDP—capture the change of economic structure of 
each province. Table 2 shows the description of variables.  
 
[insert table 2 about here] 
 
4.2 Data 
Data of GOVBE, GOVCE, NUMLG, GRANTSBE, GRANTSCE, POP, INC, URB, SOE 
and OPENNESS are from various year China Statistical Yearbooks; DEC_PL are from 
various year Provincial Finance Yearbooks and Provincial Budget Reports; 
DEC_CPBE and DEC_CPCE are from various year China Finance Yearbooks. 
 
[insert table 3 about here] 
 
Table 3 reports the mean of variables from 1995 to 2002 across 31 provinces. An 
astonishing diversity exists among different localities. Average GOVBE reaches as high 
as 60.1% of total GDP in Tibet and low as 6.3% in Jiangsu. As for the consolidated 
government size GOVCE, Tibet is still the highest one with 61.7% and Shandong 
becomes the lowest one with 10%. The decentralization degree at central-provincial 
level DEC_CPBE and DEC_CPCE ranges from 11.59 in Shanghai and 1.33 in Henan as 
well as 12.58 in Shanghai and1.66 in Guizhou, respectively. Obviously, Shanghai gain 
much more fiscal autonomy from the central compared with other province during 
1995-2002. Zhejiang seems the most decentralized with its subordinate agencies 
whose average DEC_PL (83.4%) is about 2 times more than that of Tibet (42.2%) and 
exceeds the average level across regions by 14.8%. The average central grants-in-aid 
Tibet received hold remarkable 92.8% (GRANTSBE) of its total budgetary expenditure 
and 89.8% (GRANTSCE) of its total consolidated expenditure while in Guangdong 
these two variables are only 20% and 12.7%, respectively. Tibet has the most local 
government units measured in per million populations, 32.55, and the least province is 
Chongqing with only 1.3. The maximum population is 93.3 million in Henan and the 
minimum 2.5 million in Tibet. Per capita annual income shows a large inequality 
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among different regions by highest 7,765 RMB in Shanghai and lowest 2,842 RMB in 
Gansu with an average of 4,052 RMB. The URB ranges from 11% in Tibet to 63% in 
Shanghai. Unsurprisingly, the development of private economy in costal regions is 
ahead of those inland regions. In contrast with Zhejiang in which SOEs only retain 
21% of total gross industrial output value, Qinghai, as one of the most 
underdeveloped inland provinces, is dominated by SOEs (86%). The degree of 
economic openness ranges widely from 1.47 in Guangdong to only 0.05 in Henan 
with average level of 0.2.  
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Central-provincial decentralization 
Based on following specifications, we firstly regress two different dependent 
variables (GOVBE and GOVCE) on relevant decentralization variables and conventional 
control variables: 
GOVBE,it=β0+β1 DEC_CPBE,it+β2 GRANTSBE,it+β3 NUMLGit+β4 POPit+β5 
INCit+β6 URBit +uit                                      (2) 
 
GOVCE,it=β0+β1 DEC_CPCE,it+β2 GRANTSCE,it+β3 NUMLGit+β4 POPit+β5 
INCit+β6 URBit +uit                                      (3) 
As in Oates (1985), a logistic transformation of GOVBE and GOVCE is used to allow 
the value of dependent variable to range over the entire real line. The results of the 
LSDV (least squares dummy variables) regression of these two specifications are 
reported in Model 1 and 3 in Table 5, respectively. In both case, DEC_CP and 
GRANTS show a strongly statistically significant at 1% level and positive relation 
with provincial government size, GOV, while NUMLG holds negative relation but 
statistically significant at 1% level in Model 1 and at 10% in Model 3. Our findings 
converge with Jin and Zou (2002) that federal-state (central-provincial) fiscal 
decentralization may induce a lager subnational government size. A possible 
explanation proposed by John Wallis (Wallis’s hypothesis) is that since individuals 
may have more effective checks and balances as well as control or influence on state 
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(provincial) level government agencies than those of federal (national) level and thus 
are more willing to empower them with a wider range of public functions and 
responsibilities (Oates, 1985). Therefore, our empirical results confirm that, the more 
is the central-provincial fiscal decentralization, ceteris paribus, the larger is provincial 
government size. We also find the flypaper effect in Chinese central grants-in-aid to 
province which obviously stimulate the expansion of provincial spending. The 
negative association between local government units and provincial spending 
confirms that interjurisdictional competition somehow constrains government revenue 
extraction.    
 
Consistent with Wagner’s Law, the per capita income has a strongly significantly 
positive association with provincial government size in Model 1 and 3. Statistically 
significant at 5%, urbanization exerts a positive influence on government size 
suggesting the large-scale government expenditure for investment in public 
infrastructure, city maintenance, compensation for peasants, etc., in China. By 
contrast, the coefficients of population in both specifications are insignificant.  
 
To test the robustness of estimators in Model 1 and 3, we conduct a sensitivity 
analysis by employing two additional control variables, SOE and OPENESS, into the 
specification. According to three combinations of these two variables, we have three 
test regressions in addition to Model 1 and 3, respectively. Table 4 reports the 
sensitivity results. 
[insert table 4 about here] 
 
For the model using budgetary spending as dependent variable, all coefficients of 
regressors remain the same sign as in the basic Model 1. DEC_CPBE becomes more 
significant with high bound coefficient of 0.1757 and t-ratio of 6.4053 after adding 
SOE and OPENNESS as control variables. The coefficient of GRANTBE ranges from 
1.6092 to 1.7329 at strongly statistical significance level of 1%. NUMLG keeps 
strongly significantly negative association with dependent variable. Population stays 
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statistical insignificance whereas income and urbanization are both positive with 
government size in any case. Similarly, in the case of consolidated expenditure as 
measurement of government size, any new added variable does not change the sign 
and significance level of all coefficients in the Model 3, especially for our primary 
concerned variables. The coefficient of DEC_CPCE ranges from 0.0839 to 0.0999 and 
GRANTSCE from 1.2409 to 1.3351 at 1% significance level while slight change of 
NUMLG from –0.1209 to –0.1296 at 10% significance level.  
 
[insert table 5 about here] 
 
Thus, we add SOE and OPENNESS as specific control variable to specification 2 and 
3. The similar regression results are reported in Model 2 and 4 in Table 5. DEC_CPBE, 
DEC_CPCE, GRANTSBE and GRANTSCE are strongly statistically significant at 1% 
level and positive with the dependent variable. NUMLG shows negative association 
with government size but statistically significant at 1% level in Model 2 and 10% in 
Model 4. Both income and urbanization have positive influence on government 
spending and population remains insignificant. Moreover, SOE is positive related with 
budgetary government size at 1% significance level indicating budgetary spending on 
subsidies to loss-making SOEs induce expansion of total government size. Including 
extrabudgetary expenditure into consolidated expenditure, the sign of SOE changes 
into negative but statistically insignificant. Possible interpretation is that 
extrabudgetary expenditure is not close linked to SOEs and usually spends on 
infrastructure, urban construction, education, pension, medical insurance and so on. 
The coefficients of OPENNESS in both cases are positive and strongly statistically 
significant at 1% level which suggests an open local economy in China needs 
government support and development in terms of investment in infrastructure to 
improve local investment environment.    
 
5.2 Provincial-local decentralization 
 The procedure is similar with that in earlier section where we firstly regress two 
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basic specifications with conventional control variables and then conduct the 
sensitivity analysis. Finally, regression results including specific control variables are 
reported.  
GOVBE,it=β0+β1 DEC_PL,it+β2 GRANTSBE,it+β3 NUMLGit+β4 POPit+β5 
INCit+β6 URBit +uit                                      (4) 
 
GOVCE,it=β0+β1 DEC_PL,it+β2 GRANTSCE,it+β3 NUMLGit+β4 POPit+β5 
INCit+β6 URBit +uit                                      (5) 
 
Model 5 and 7 in Table 7 show the regression results of specification 4 and 5. The 
strongly significant negative relation between DEC_PL and dependent variable in 
both cases indicates provincial-local decentralization curtails aggregate provincial 
government size which lends strong support to Leviathan hypothesis that fiscal 
decentralization may constrain overall reach of the state. Central grants-in-aid to 
province still strongly stimulate expansion of provincial budgetary and extrabudgetary 
spending suggested by the positive coefficients at 1% significance level. Number of 
local government unit holds negative sign but at 10% significance level which implies 
current division of administration area may be, to a large extent, based on 
geographical principle and not for the sake of introducing interjurisdictional 
competition. For the conventional control variables, income and urbanization boost 
government spending while population exhibits a negative but statistically 
insignificant association with government size which may suggest an insufficient 
local public good and service is provided relative to a huge population base in China. 
 
[insert table 6 about here] 
 
Table 6 reports the sensitivity results. For specification 4, DEC_PL reaches its low 
bound of -0.522817 and GRANTSBE reaches its high bound of 1.608128 at 1% 
significance level after adding SOE and OPENNESS. The coefficient of NUMLG 
ranges from -0.134124 to -0.131556 at 10% significance level. POP stays 
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insignificant and INC and URB remain significant positive. Similar results are 
obtained for consolidated expenditure as dependent variable. The coefficient of 
DEC_PL is consistently negative at low bound of -0.447505 but significant at 5% 
level and GRANTSCE strongly significantly positive at its high bound of 1.243635. 
The NUMLG shows consistently negative sign at its low and high bound and 
significant at 10% level. POP is insignificant and INC and URB significant positive in 
any case. 
 
[insert table 7 about here] 
 
Therefore, we include the SOE and OPENNESS as specific control variables and 
regression results are reported in Model 6 and 8 in Table 7. The coefficients of our 
primary concerned variables are not changed by adding SOE and OPENNESS. 
DEC_PL and NUMLG remain negative against dependent variable but at 1% and 10% 
significance level, respectively. GRANTSBE and GRANTSCE keep strong positive effect 
on provincial government size. Population stays negative but statistically insignificant 
and income and urbanization is positive. SOE and OPENNESS are insignificant in 
both cases except SOE shows strong negative sign at 1% significance level in Model 8. 
The interpretation has been proposed in preceding section.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 This paper offers a new data set and window to empirically test Leviathan theory in 
the sense of China’s transition economy and also explain the superficial contradiction 
of China’s empirical fact with Wagner’s Law. Analyzing provincial panel data and 
various variables used by previous empirical studies, we test the Leviathan hypothesis 
for vertical decentralization, horizontal fragmentation and intergovernmental 
collusion at central-provincial and provincial-local level, respectively. The results 
demonstrate that fiscal decentralization in terms of vertical expenditure 
decentralization at different level exerts effects on government size poles apart. The 
central-provincial decentralization stimulates expansion of provincial government 
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spending (Wallis’s hypothesis) whereas provincial-local decentralization imposes 
constraints on it (Leviathan hypothesis). Without a traditional democratic monitoring 
process in China, fiscal decentralization may assume as a powerful institutional 
restriction to curtail the government size and foster the market development. 
Moreover, the intergovernmental collusion hypothesis is empirically verified that such 
institutional rearrangement of tax power would weaken interjurisdicational 
competition and, ultimately, the effect of fiscal decentralization on the reach of the 
state. Yet, we find a relative weak empirical support of the fragmentation dimension 
of fiscal decentralization curbing growth of provincial government spending. 
Furthermore, in addition to three plausible explanations for a shrinking public sector 
in China, we offer an alternative approach that fiscal decentralization contributes to 
restrict government size as well.  
 
 Additionally, some interesting findings present helpful policy implications. From 
increasing population perspective, the supply of public goods and services is 
insufficient at provincial level in China. If government failed to address such problem, 
it would endanger sustainable development of future China. The loss-making SOEs 
are major financial burden of provincial budgetary budget while extrabudgetary 
expenditure seems less linked to SOEs. An open local economy needs government 
support and development in terms of more expenditure on improving local investment 
environment. 
 
 Overall, we find empirical support for Leviathan theory although it is still not 
conclusive. With regard to almost two decades searching for Leviathan, our 
contribution only provides an empirical result based on a new but particular case of 
transition China. Further empirical studies should be done to measure government 
size, fiscal decentralization and interjurisdictional competition more precisely. And 
new data set is also helpful to address such “fussy issue”.    
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Appendix 
Sample of provinces, China: 
East Middle West 
Beijing Jilin Guangxi 
Tianjin Heilongjiang Guizhou 
Hebei Shanxi Yunnan 
Liaoning Inner Mongolia Tibet 
Shandong Jiangxi Shaanxi 
Shanghai Anhui Gansu 
Jiangsu Henan Qinghai 
Zhejiang Hubei Ningxia 
Fujian Hunan Xinjiang 
Guangdong Chongqing  
Hainan Sichuan  
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Table 2 Variable descriptions 
Variable Descriptions 
GOVBE,it Ratio of aggregate provincial budgetary expenditure to provincial GDP in 
province i and year t 
GOVCE,it Ratio of aggregate consolidated expenditure to provincial GDP in province i and 
year t 
DEC_CPBE,it Ratio of aggregate provincial budgetary expenditure to central budgetary 
expenditure in province i and year t, expressed in per capita term 
DEC_CPCE,it Ratio of aggregate provincial consolidated expenditure to central consolidated 
expenditure in province i and year t, expressed in per capita term 
DEC_PLit Ratio of subprovincial consolidated expenditure to aggregate provincial 
consolidated expenditure in province i and year t 
GRANTSBE,it Ratio of central grants to aggregate provincial budgetary expenditure in province 
i and year t 
GRANTSCE,it Ratio of central grants to aggregate provincial consolidated expenditure in 
province i and year t 
NUMLGit Number of local government units per million population 
POPit Population in province i and year t (in millions) 
INCit Average of per capita income in urban and rural region in province i and year t 
(in RMB) 
URBit Percentage of population residing within urban area in province i and year t  
SOEit Ratio of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in total provincial gross industrial 
output value in province i and year t 
OPENNESSit Ratio of total volume of foreign trade (the sum of exports and imports) in 
provincial GDP in province i and year t 
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Table 4 Sensitivity results for central-provincial decentralization 
    Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic
Adjusted 
R-squared 
S.E. of 
regression Other variables 
Dependent variable: GOVBE 
DEC_CPBE high 0.1757 0.0274 6.4053 0.9727 0.0989SOE, OPENNESS 
 base 0.1372 0.028 4.8996 0.9675 0.1077 
 low        
GRANTBE high 1.7329 0.1141 15.1893 0.9689 0.1054OPENNESS 
 base 1.6957 0.1226 13.8327 0.9675 0.1077 
 low  1.6092 0.1265 12.7172 0.9694 0.1046SOE 
NUMLG high       
 base -0.1698 0.0564 -3.0091 0.9675 0.1077 
 low  -0.1906 0.0499 -3.8193 0.9727 0.0989SOE, OPENNESS 
POP high 0.0016 0.0023 0.6865 0.9727 0.0989SOE, OPENNESS 
 base 0.0005 0.0027 0.1864 0.9675 0.1077 
 low  0.0002 0.0026 0.094 0.9689 0.1054OPENNESS 
INC high 0.0002 0 14.4421 0.9694 0.1046SOE 
 base 0.0002 0 14.7532 0.9675 0.1077 
 low  0.0002 0 15.5328 0.9689 0.1054OPENNESS 
URB high       
 base 0.2238 0.1067 2.0975 0.9675 0.1077 
 low  0.1985 0.0971 2.0437 0.9727 0.0989SOE, OPENNESS 
        
Dependent variable: GOVCE 
DEC_CPCE high 0.0999 0.0204 4.9061 0.9518 0.1118OPENNESS 
 base 0.0883 0.0202 4.3752 0.9493 0.1147 
 low  0.0839 0.0202 4.163 0.9501 0.1138SOE 
GRANTCE high 1.3351 0.1245 10.7276 0.9519 0.1117SOE, OPENNESS 
 base 1.2409 0.1167 10.6319 0.9493 0.1147 
 low        
NUMLG high       
 base -0.1209 0.0736 -1.6435 0.9493 0.1147 
 low  -0.1296 0.0713 -1.8181 0.9518 0.1118OPENNESS 
POP high       
 base -0.0001 0.0025 -0.0207 0.9493 0.1147 
 low  -0.0005 0.0025 -0.2093 0.9501 0.1138SOE 
INC high       
 base 0.0001 0 10.7996 0.9493 0.1147 
 low  0.0001 0 9.5183 0.9519 0.1117SOE, OPENNESS 
URB high       
 base 0.2474 0.0966 2.5602 0.9493 0.1147 
  low  0.2294 0.0924 2.4829 0.9519 0.1117SOE, OPENNESS 
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Table 5 LSDV estimates for central-provincial decentralization: 1995-2002 
Dependent Variable: GOVBE Dependent Variable: GOVCE 
Variables  Model(1) Model(2) Model(3) Model(4) 
Constant -3.5250  -4.1790  -2.5287  -2.5334  
 (-11.5310) (-14.4407)  (-6.4152) (-6.5694)  
DEC_CPBE 0.1372*** 0.1757***   
 (4.8996)  (6.4053)    
DEC_CPCE   0.0883*** 0.0962***  
   (4.3752)  (4.6085)  
GRANTBE 1.6957*** 1.6269***    
 (13.8327)  (14.4661)    
GRANTCE   1.2409*** 1.3351***  
   (10.6319)  (10.7276)  
NUMLG -0.1698*** -0.1906***  -0.1209* -0.1294*  
 (-3.0091) (-3.8193)  (-1.6435) (-1.8135)  
POP 0.0005  0.0016  -0.0001  -0.0003  
 (0.1864)  (0.6865)  (-0.0207) (-0.1392)  
INC 0.0002*** 0.0002***  0.0001*** 0.0001***  
 (14.7532)  (15.6926)  (10.7996)  (9.5183)  
URB 0.2238** 0.1985**  0.2474** 0.2294**  
 (2.0975)  (2.0437)  (2.5602)  (2.4829)  
SOE  0.7265***   -0.1660  
  (6.1216)   (-1.4320)  
OPENNESS  0.6823***   0.4538***  
  (5.0653)   (3.0619)  
Provincial effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9675  0.9727  0.9493  0.9519  
Observations 243  243  243  243  
Notes: 
a. t-statistics in parentheses. 
b. * Statistically significant at 10% level; ** statistically significant at 5% level; *** statistically 
significant at 1% level. 
c. White diagonal standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction). 
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Table 6 Sensitivity results for provincial-local decentralization 
    Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic
Adjusted 
R-squared 
S.E. of 
regression Other variables 
Dependent variable: GOVBE 
DEC_PL high   
 base -0.5118 0.1831 -2.7957 0.9533 0.1310  
 low  -0.5228 0.1915 -2.7295 0.9529 0.1316 SOE, OPENNESS 
GRANTBE high 1.6081 0.1505 10.6871 0.9529 0.1316 SOE, OPENNESS 
 base 1.5963 0.1517 10.5225 0.9533 0.1310  
 low    
NUMLG high -0.1316 0.0841 -1.5639 0.9531 0.1313 SOE 
 base -0.1320 0.0843 -1.5666 0.9533 0.1310  
 low  -0.1341 0.0840 -1.5959 0.9531 0.1313 OPENNESS 
POP high     
 base -0.0022 0.0029 -0.7697 0.9533 0.1310  
 low  -0.0024 0.0029 -0.8115 0.9529 0.1316 SOE, OPENNESS 
INC high     
 base 0.0002 0.0000 13.9710 0.9533 0.1310  
 low  0.0002 0.0000 13.9534 0.9531 0.1313 OPENNESS 
URB high       
 base 0.2342 0.1471 1.5920 0.9533 0.1310  
 low  0.2312 0.1468 1.5751 0.9529 0.1316 SOE, OPENNESS 
        
Dependent variable: GOVCE 
DEC_PL high   
 base -0.3763 0.1792 -2.1004 0.9363 0.1306  
 low  -0.4475 0.1803 -2.4824 0.9391 0.1276 SOE 
GRANTCE high 1.2436 0.1429 8.7007 0.9391 0.1276 SOE 
 base 1.1463 0.1415 8.0986 0.9363 0.1306  
 low        
NUMLG high -0.1302 0.0857 -1.5203 0.9389 0.1279 SOE, OPENNESS 
 base -0.1356 0.0880 -1.5416 0.9363 0.1306  
 low  -0.1373 0.0877 -1.5650 0.9360 0.1309 OPENNESS 
POP high       
 base -0.0030 0.0026 -1.1682 0.9363 0.1306  
 low  -0.0034 0.0026 -1.3151 0.9391 0.1276 SOE 
INC high       
 base 0.0001 0.0000 8.5161 0.9363 0.1306  
 low  0.0001 0.0000 7.9517 0.9391 0.1276 SOE 
URB high       
 base 0.2351 0.1229 1.9124 0.9363 0.1306  
  low  0.2164 0.1174 1.8437 0.9391 0.1276 SOE 
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Table 7 LSDV estimates for provincial-local decentralization: 1995-2002 
Dependent Variable: GOVBE Dependent Variable: GOVCE 
Variables  Model(5) Model(6) Model(7) Model(8) 
Constant -2.6030 -2.5765 -1.6657 -1.3128 
 (-5.8501) (-5.6973) (-3.7331) (-3.0045) 
DEC_PL -0.5118*** -0.5228*** -0.3763** -0.4471*** 
 (-2.7957) (-2.7295) (-2.1004) (-2.4842) 
GRANTBE 1.5963*** 1.6081***   
 (10.5225) (10.6871)   
GRANTCE   1.1463*** 1.2394*** 
   (8.0986) (8.4568) 
NUMLG -0.1320* -0.1335* -0.1356* -0.1302* 
 (-1.5666) (-1.5882) (-1.5416) (-1.5203) 
POP -0.0022 -0.0024 -0.0030 -0.0034 
 (-0.7697) (-0.8115) (-1.1682) (-1.3033) 
INC 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (13.9710) (13.8906) (8.5161) (7.1203) 
URB 0.2342* 0.2312* 0.2351* 0.2177* 
 (1.5920) (1.5751) (1.9124) (1.8542) 
SOE  -0.0446  -0.5278*** 
  (-0.3539)  (-4.3666) 
OPENNESS  0.0737  -0.0557 
  (0.4848)  (-0.3055) 
Provincial effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9533 0.9529 0.9363 0.9389 
Observations 234 234 234 234 
Notes: 
a. t-statistics in parentheses. 
b. * Statistically significant at 10% level; ** statistically significant at 5% level; *** statistically 
significant at 1% level. 
c. White diagonal standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction).  
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Figure 1 Government expenditure and as a percentage of GDP: 1978-2002 
Source: China Statistic Yearbook, 1996-2003 
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Figure 2 Development of non-state sector 
Source: China Statistic Yearbook, 1996-2000 
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Figure 3 Government expenditure by function (% of GDP) 
Source: China Statistic Yearbook, 1996-2003
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Figure 4 Government revenue by source (%) 
Source: China Statistic Yearbook, 1996-2003 
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Figure 5 Government revenue, expenditure and balance as a percentage of GDP 
Source: China Statistic Yearbook, 1996-2003 
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Figure 6 Government budgetary and extrabudgetary revenue as a percentage of GDP 
Source: China Statistic Yearbook, 1996-2003 
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Figure 7 Central and local share of budgetary government revenue and expenditure 
Source: China Statistic Yearbook, 1996-2003
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Figure 8 Central and local share of extrabudgetary government revenue and expenditure  
Source: China Statistic Yearbook, 1996-2003
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Table 1 Empirical literature of Leviathan hypotheses 
Author(s) Size of government 
Leviathan 
hypotheses 
Measurement Level of observation units Time Result 
Oates (1972) Taxes/national income Decentralization Central taxes/total taxes 57 countries 1972 No 
Sjoquist (1982) GOVE per capita Fragmentation Number of jurisdiction in an SMSA 48 southern SMSAs, US 1972 Yes 
Subnational taxes/personal 
income 
Decentralization 
Fragmentation  
Collusion  
State GOVR (GOVE)/subnational GOVR(GOVE) 
Number of local government units 
Intergovernmental grants/subnational GOVR 
48 states, US 1977 
No 
No 
Yes  Oates (1985) 
GOVR/GDP 
Decentralization 
Collusion  
Central GOVR (GOVE)/total GOVR (GOVE) 
Intergovernmental grants/total GOVR 
43 countries 1982 
No 
Yes  
Schneider (1986) GOVE per capita Fragmentation 
Number of suburban municipalities in an SMSA per 
100,000 capita 
757 suburban municipalities 
in 46 SMSAs, US 
1972-77 Yes 
Nelson (1986) 
Subnational tax per capita 
Subnational tax/personal 
income 
Decentralization 
Fragmentation 
State taxes/total subnational taxes 
Population per county (special district) 
49 states, US 1976 
No  
Yes(No) 
Nelson (1987) 
Subnational taxes 
(GOVE)/personal income 
Fragmentation Number of general-purpose (single-) units per capita 50 states, US 1977 Yes (No) 
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Wallis&Oates 
(1988) 
Subnational GOVR 
(GOVE)/per capita 
income 
Decentralization State GOVR (GOVE)/subnational GOVR (GOVE) 48 states, US 1902-1982 Yes (Yes) 
2900 counties, US Yes (No)  Eberts&Gronberg 
(1988) 
GOVE/personal income Fragmentation 
Number of general-purpose (single-) units, per capita, 
per square mile 280 SMSAs, US 
1977 
Yes (No) 
Marlow (1988) GOVE/GNP Decentralization Subnational GOVE/total GOVE US 1946-1985 Yes 
Zax (1989) 
County GOVR/personal 
income 
Decentralization 
Fragmentation 
County GOVR/total local GOVR 
Number of general-purpose (single-) governments per 
1000 capita 
3022 counties 1982 
Yes 
Yes (No) 
Forbes&Zampelli 
(1989) 
County taxes/income, 
county taxes per capita, 
county GOVR/income, 
county GOVR per capita 
Fragmentation Number of counties in an SMSA 
345 counties in 157 SMSAs, 
US 
1977 No 
Raimondo (1989) 
GOVE/personal income 
(e.g. six forms) 
Collusion 
Federal-funded GOVE/state-local GOVE 
Local-funded GOVE/state-local GOVE 
50 states, US 
1960, 1970, 
1980 
Yes 
Grossman (1989a) GOVE/GNP 
Decentralization 
Collusion 
Subnational GOVE/total GOVE 
Federal grants/subnational GOVR 
US 1946-1986 
Yes 
Yes 
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Subnational 
GOVR/personal income 
Collusion 
Fragmentation  
Per capita state-to-local transfers 
Population per multiple function government 
48 states, US 1976-77 
Yes 
No Grossman (1989b) 
GOVR/GNP Collusion Per capita federal grants US 1948-1984 Yes 
Joulfain&Marlow 
(1990) 
GOVE/GSP 
Decentralization 
Fragmentation 
Collusion 
Subnational GOVE/total GOVE 
Number of local governments 
Federal grants/subnational GOVE 
50 states, US 1981, 1984 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Eberts&Gronberg 
(1990) 
Own-source GOVR 
(GOVE)/personal income 
Fragmentation Number of local jurisdictions 218 SMSAs, US 1977 Yes 
Joulfaian&Marlow 
(1991) 
GOVE/GSP 
Per capita GOVE 
Decentralization 
Fragmentation 
Collusion 
Subnational GOVE/total GOVE( Local 
GOVE/subnational GOVE) 
Number of local governments  
Federal grants/subnational GOVE 
48 states, US 1983-1985 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Heil (1991) GOVE (GOVR)/GDP Decentralization 
Central GOVR (GOVE)/total GOVR (GOVE) 
Dummy variable for federal structure 
22 OECD and 39 IMF 
countries 
1985 
No (No) 
No 
Grossman (1992) GOVE/GDP 
Decentralization 
Collusion 
Central (state/local) GOVE/total GOVE 
Grants/total state-local GOVR 
Australia 1950-1984 
No (No) 
Yes 
Grossman&West GOVE/GNP Decentralization Central (province/local) GOVE/total GOVE Canada 1958-1987 Yes 
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(1994) Collusion Grants/total provincial-local GOVR Yes 
Anderson&van 
Den Berg (1998) 
GOVR/GDP Decentralization Central GOVR (GOVE)/total GOVR (GOVE) 45 countries 1990 Yes (Yes) 
Stein (1999) GOVE/GDP 
Decentralization 
Collusion 
Subnational GOVE/total GOVE 
Local program financed by central funds 
19 Latin American and some 
OECD countries 
Average 
1990-1995 
No 
Yes  
Shadbegian (1999) GOVE/GSP 
Decentralization 
Collusion 
State and local own-purpose GOVE/total GOVE 
Central-state and state-local grants/total state-local 
GOVR 
48 states, US 1979-1992 
Yes 
Yes 
Moesen&van 
Cauwenberge 
(2000) 
GOVE/GDP Decentralization Local taxes/total GOVE 19 OECD countries 1990-1992 Yes 
de Mello (2001) Per capita GOVE 
Decentralization 
Fragmentation 
Collusion 
Rayon’s GOVR (GOVE)/total GOVR (GOVE) 
Number of cities and communes in rayon 
Per capita grants 
38 rayons, Moldova 1998 
Yes (Yes) 
Yes 
Yes 
Jin&Zou (2002) GOVE/GDP 
Decentralization 
Collusion 
Subnational GOVR (GOVE)/total GOVR (GOVE) 
Central grants/subnational GOVE 
17 industrial and 15 
developing countries 
1980-1994 
Yes (No) 
Yes 
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Decentralization 
Collusion 
Own-source subnational revenue/total revenue 
Grants/total GOVR 
44 countries 1978-1997 
No 
Yes 
Decentralization 
Collusion 
Own-source subnational revenue/total revenue 
Grants/total GOVR 
25 countries 1980-1993 
No 
Yes 
Rodden (2003) GOVE/GDP 
Decentralization 
Collusion 
subnational revenue/total revenue 
Grants/total GOVR 
18 OECD countries 
Average 
1985-95 
Yes 
Yes 
Kwon (2003) GOVE/GDP 
Decentralization 
Collusion 
Local GOVE/total GOVE 
Central-to-local grants 
Korea 1979-2001 
Yes 
Yes 
Feld et al (2003) Per capita GOVR 
Decentralization 
Fragmentation 
Collusion 
Communal GOVR/ subnational GOVR per capita 
Number of communes per capita 
Net central-to-canton grants per capita 
26 Swiss cantons 1980-1998 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
205 counties, US 
No 
Yes 
Campbell (2004) Per capita GOVE 
Decentralization 
Fragmentation 
Own GOVE/ municipalities and counties GOVE 
Number of units per 100,000 capita 
665 municipalities, US 
1982 
Yes 
No 
Note: 
GOVE: Government expenditure, GOVR: Government revenue, GSP: Gross state product, GDP: Gross domestic product, GNP: Gross national product. 
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Table 3 Mean of variables: 1995-2002 
REGION GOVBE GOVCE DEC_CPBE DEC_CPCE DEC_PL GRANTBE GRANTCE NUMLG POP INC URB SOE OPENNESS 
Beijing 0.154 0.204 8.438 10.298 0.500 0.203 0.123 1.383 0.131 6692.569 0.568 0.633 0.767 
Tianjin 0.111 0.142 5.535 6.479 0.479 0.299 0.224 1.854 0.097 5375.510 0.537 0.349 0.795 
Hebei 0.077 0.104 1.755 2.145 0.748 0.384 0.275 2.781 0.660 3795.148 0.183 0.511 0.094 
Shanxi 0.125 0.183 2.021 2.686 0.732 0.430 0.264 4.062 0.320 3120.997 0.251 0.666 0.141 
Inner 
Mongolia 0.161 0.189 2.849 3.050 0.743 0.598 0.500 4.815 0.234 3171.994 0.321 0.762 0.103 
Liaoning 0.108 0.145 3.598 4.373 0.801 0.370 0.260 2.738 0.416 3661.288 0.444 0.627 0.342 
Jilin 0.133 0.168 2.761 3.206 0.652 0.550 0.424 2.598 0.266 3333.726 0.420 0.769 0.148 
Heilongjiang 0.107 0.133 2.772 3.185 0.664 0.465 0.369 3.820 0.376 3377.899 0.420 0.785 0.119 
Shanghai 0.133 0.160 11.586 12.575 0.544 0.200 0.136 1.300 0.152 7765.047 0.631 0.456 0.878 
Jiangsu 0.063 0.101 2.223 3.250 0.802 0.275 0.150 1.662 0.724 4842.614 0.272 0.283 0.390 
Zhejiang 0.067 0.109 2.615 3.967 0.834 0.281 0.135 2.201 0.450 6244.551 0.206 0.213 0.356 
Anhui 0.096 0.130 1.465 1.830 0.705 0.419 0.303 1.971 0.616 3393.259 0.184 0.542 0.087 
Fujian 0.080 0.126 2.801 3.978 0.765 0.281 0.156 2.776 0.335 4851.144 0.206 0.289 0.501 
Jiangxi 0.106 0.148 1.584 2.007 0.749 0.476 0.322 2.644 0.416 3344.404 0.204 0.727 0.072 
Shandong 0.069 0.100 1.975 2.611 0.828 0.285 0.177 1.754 0.889 4140.431 0.245 0.409 0.259 
Henan 0.081 0.114 1.327 1.700 0.781 0.417 0.286 1.874 0.933 3177.274 0.170 0.536 0.052 
Hubei 0.082 0.107 1.740 2.087 0.745 0.427 0.317 1.922 0.591 3637.828 0.268 0.569 0.082 
Hunan 0.093 0.139 1.583 2.164 0.715 0.458 0.302 2.093 0.650 3906.886 0.186 0.615 0.064 
Guangdong 0.108 0.137 4.153 4.790 0.830 0.200 0.127 1.930 0.745 6330.030 0.313 0.233 1.472 
Guangxi 0.119 0.162 1.671 2.111 0.727 0.445 0.300 2.657 0.466 3790.553 0.165 0.613 0.106 
Hainan 0.127 0.165 2.701 3.195 0.663 0.386 0.290 2.888 0.076 3679.896 0.233 0.592 0.298 
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Chongqing 0.112 0.152 1.616 2.134 0.630 0.454 0.359 1.299 0.308 3998.483 0.210 0.652 0.085 
Sichuan 0.100 0.142 1.426 1.882 0.772 0.417 0.276 2.306 0.923 3540.168 0.172 0.575 0.067 
Guizhou 0.186 0.225 1.489 1.655 0.717 0.562 0.445 2.616 0.365 3077.964 0.137 0.771 0.072 
Yunnan 0.205 0.243 3.012 3.220 0.713 0.555 0.459 3.461 0.417 3641.708 0.131 0.796 0.096 
Tibet 0.601 0.617 7.782 7.231 0.422 0.928 0.898 32.553 0.025 4369.945 0.106 0.747 0.137 
Shaanxi 0.141 0.178 1.783 2.052 0.639 0.516 0.392 3.066 0.397 2982.971 0.260 0.748 0.125 
Gansu 0.170 0.208 1.953 2.185 0.563 0.616 0.493 3.959 0.252 2842.396 0.214 0.760 0.068 
Qinghai 0.239 0.267 3.677 3.756 0.547 0.744 0.659 10.089 0.051 3026.474 0.252 0.861 0.093 
Ningxia 0.218 0.261 3.140 3.451 0.557 0.640 0.520 5.192 0.054 3049.381 0.302 0.728 0.129 
Xinjiang 0.147 0.185 3.257 3.735 0.706 0.596 0.452 6.236 0.179 3444.632 0.337 0.845 0.134 
              
Mean 0.156  0.193  2.939  3.436  0.698  0.483  0.367  5.446  0.348 3800.777 0.285  0.628 0.199  
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